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INCENTIVE FFECTS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE t 
The Effects of Malpractice Litigation 
on Physicians' Fees and Incomes 
By PATRICIA M. DANZON, MARK V. PAULY, AND RAYNARD S. KINGTON* 
For many years physicians and other med- 
ical providers in the United States have been 
subject to a negligence rule of liability. Un- 
der a negligence rule, patients who suffer an 
adverse outcome are entitled to compensa- 
tion if they can show that they incurred an 
injury that was caused by the physician's 
failure to take due care, defined as departure 
from the customary standard of care of 
physicians in good standing in the profes- 
sion. The traditional tort standard of dam- 
ages is full compensation for monetary and 
nonmonetary loss. 
There have been no major doctrinal shifts 
in the law expanding liability for medical 
malpractice over the last decade-indeed, 
many states have enacted tort reforms de- 
signed to reduce the number and size of 
claims. Nevertheless, from 1975 to 1984, 
claims per physician rose at an average rate 
of 10 percent a year; between 1982 and 1986 
claim frequency per 100 physicians rose from 
13.5 to 17.2 a year. (See Danzon, 1988, and 
sources cited therein.) Claim severity (aver- 
age amount per paid claim) increased at 
roughly twice the rate of the CPI from 1975 
to 1984. In 1984, the median and mean 
payment were $18,000 and $80,741, respec- 
tively. There remain large differences among 
states and among specialties in claim fre- 
quency and severity. 
Costs of malpractice insurance have also 
increased dramatically, but more erratically 
than claims costs. Following the malpractice 
"crisis" of the mid-1970s, when rates in- 
creased by over 300 percent in a single year 
in some states, rates remained stable or actu- 
ally fell in the late 1970s, but resumed an 
upward trend in the 1980s. Between 1977 
and 1984, rates for basic limits of coverage 
increased by 109 percent for the lowest-risk 
specialists, such as GPs doing no surgery, 
180 percent for obstetricians, and 189 per- 
cent for the highest-risk surgical specialists. 
Although malpractice insurance is still less 
than 2 percent of total health care expendi- 
tures, many observers argue that medical 
malpractice is a major factor contributing to 
rising health care costs. One implication of 
such arguments is that virtually all the cost 
is borne by patients. This seems at odds with 
arguments made by others, that a significant 
fraction of physicians are giving up practice, 
or at least high-risk procedures, because of 
liability. 
Full and automatic pass-through of costs 
is also potentially at odds with the deterrent 
purposes of the negligence rule of liability, 
which is to correct the potential underprovi- 
sion of care in a market with asymmetric 
information and systematic underestimate of 
risk by consumers. With a shift from no 
liability to a perfect negligence system, we 
might observe an increase in preventive mea- 
sures by physicians, an increase in prices, 
and an increase in gross revenues. This would 
occur if patients perceived the improvement 
in quality and valued it at cost, and the 
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system had been nonoptimal without liabil- 
ity-but nonoptimality is inconsistent with 
fully informed patients.' With imperfect in- 
formation on the part of courts, liability 
insurers, and consumers, the incidence and 
incentive effects of the tort system are uncer- 
tain a priori and become an empirical ques- 
tion. 
In this paper we discuss some of the theo- 
retical and empirical issues in estimating the 
effects of malpractice litigation on physi- 
cians' fees and incomes and summarize some 
new empirical estimates. 
I. Effects of Malpractice 
on Physician Pricing in the Short Run 
Assume that cross-sectional differences 
and the intertemporal increase in claim fre- 
quency and severity reflect changes in the 
legal system that increase the probability 
and expected size of a malpractice recovery 
for the plaintiff, conditional on the oc- 
currence of an injury.2 Let us characterize 
the "generosity" of the legal regime by an 
index J. 
Malpractice litigation creates two types of 
cost for physicians: the cost of claims and 
legal defense that can be covered by insur- 
ance; and the cost of own time in claim 
defense, loss of reputation, anxiety, etc. that 
are uninsurable. Under current methods of 
rating malpractice insurance, the cost of in- 
surance depends on the physician's specialty, 
limits of coverage, whether or not certain 
high-risk procedures are performed at all 
(for example, any surgery by GPs, obstetrics 
by OB/GYNs) and the decision to practice 
full or part-time. Given these basic practice 
choices, the premium is a fixed cost, inde- 
pendent of number of patient contacts.3 The 
uninsured costs are a marginal per patient 
cost equal to the expected cost if sued. This 
marginal cost increases with claim frequency 
and severity. On the other hand, if physi- 
cians maximize utility rather than profit, an 
increase in premiums that reduces net in- 
come should lower the physician's implicit 
opportunity cost of time, assuming leisure is 
a normal good. In that case, an increase in J 
should lower marginal cost. An increase in J 
may also affect patients' demand for care, if 
patients perceive and value any risk-reducing 
measures taken by physicians, or if they 
perceive and value any increase in the proba- 
bility or amount of compensation if injured. 
How does an increase in J affect physi- 
cians' prices and net incomes? Consider the 
simple case where firm-level demand is not 
affected by changes in potential malpractice 
awards and the physician-firm is a profit 
maximizer operating in a monopolistically 
competitive market (Pauly and Mark Sat- 
terthwaite, 1981). Further assume that long- 
run equilibrium requires the equalization of 
(real) net incomes across market areas. 
We consider two basic models of the pro- 
cess of adjustment to market equilibrium 
following an increase in J. At one extreme, 
physicians simply purchase higher limits of 
coverage but do not otherwise change their 
practice patterns. There is full incidence of 
the increased insurance and uninsured costs 
on physicians and hence a sharp reduction in 
net incomes and even larger reduction in 
utility. This would be a short-run equilib- 
rium if physicians are profit maximizers and 
the changes in premiums are viewed as a 
fixed cost. 
1If patients perceive the average quality of care but 
not the care of individual physicians, then full pass- 
through of the costs of additional care under a perfect 
negligence rule may be possible, even though market 
forces alone would create suboptimal incentives for 
care. 
2For an analysis of the effects of legal, medical, and 
demographic factors on the frequency and severity of 
malpractice claims by state, see Danzon (1984; 1986). 
California data for 1974 indicate that, at most, 1 in 10 
injuries due to negligence led to a claim and 1 in 25 
received compensation. Thus some increase in claim 
frequency is possible without assuming a change in the 
rate of negligence or a proplaintiff shift in the law. 
3Although explicit experience rating is not wide- 
spread, implicit experience rating occurs because physi- 
cians with very poor claims records may face restric- 
tions on their practice or be denied coverage by more 
selective insurers who charge lower premiums. Periods 
of sharply rising premiums marketwide are usually ac- 
companied by a tightening of underwriting standards. 
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In long-run equilibrium, stable differences 
in J must be reflected either in price levels 
or in differences in "quality" that are cost 
saving to physicians, assuming equalization 
of (real) net income per physician across 
market areas. Physician migration is ex- 
pected to be the primary equilibrating device 
in this first model if premiums are treated as 
a fixed cost by individual profit-maximizing 
physicians and increases in malpractice liti- 
gation do not raise marginal costs due to 
(implicit) expected uninsured costs. 
In the second model, an increase in J does 
significantly raise physicians' perceived 
marginal costs and trigger an increase in 
prices in the short run that could exceed the 
increase in marginal cost.4 Assuming that the 
market for physicians' services is monopolis- 
tically competitive, the profit-maximizing 
change in price is 
(1) dP/dJ= [dMC/dJ ][1+(1,/ED)f1 
where MC is marginal cost and ED is the 
firm-level price elasticity of demand, as- 
sumed constant. Price may increase by more 
or less than MC depending on ED. For 
example, using Thomas McCarthy's (1985) 
rough estimate of -3 for demand elasticity, 
price will rise by 3/2 times any increase in 
marginal cost. However, if demand becomes 
more elastic as price rises (for example, if 
demand is linear), then price may rise by an 
amount less than or equal to marginal cost. 
But, if the increase in J affects all physi- 
cians in an area equally, then the final effect 
on prices and incomes depends on market 
demand, not the individual firm demand 
elasticity. If the market demand elasticity is 
low, the final outcome can be an increase in 
price with minimal reduction in quantity, 
almost no change in gross or net income, 
and hence almost no migration. This combi- 
nation of relatively elastic demand at the 
firm level but inelastic demand at the market 
level is a reasonable conjecture for physician 
services markets. 
There are alternative assumptions that 
would yield the same short-run effect on 
price. The physician services market might 
be characterized as oligopolistic, and the in- 
crease in fixed costs might be used as a 
signal to raise prices. Alternatively, if insur- 
ers rapidly and automatically incorporate 
premium cost increases into their reimburse- 
ment levels, institutional mechanisms could 
facilitate a rapid adjustment in fee levels 
such that physician incomes are protected 
from even short-run incidence and there is 
no strong stimulus to adjustment of physi- 
cian stocks. 
II. Data 
The data used in this study are from the 
1976, 1978, and 1983 surveys of Physicians' 
Practice Costs and Incomes (PPCI), con- 
ducted for the Health Care Financing Ad- 
ministration. Each of these surveys occurred 
at a different point in the malpractice insur- 
ance "cycle." The 1976 survey follows two 
years of rapidly rising premium rates; in the 
two years prior to the 1978 survey, rates 
were flat or falling. Beginning in 1980, rates 
then began to rise again.5 These data permit 
both cross-sectional and time-series (first 
difference) analysis of the relationship be- 
tween physicians' fees, reimbursement levels, 
and incomes, on the one hand, and measures 
of the malpractice climate on the other. 
We use three measures of the "malpractice 
climate": state-level claim frequency per 
physician, state-level claim severity (average 
payment per paid claim), and the rate 
charged by the leading malpractice insurer in 
the state for basic limits coverage. This rate 
is not a fully accurate measure of the rele- 
vant price of insurance because the majority 
of physicians buy excess limits of coverage, 
for which rates are nonlinear, but fairly uni- 
form across states. Claim frequency is a 
4Another alternative not addressed here is that physi- 
cian outflow may reduce physician inputs and quality 
per unit of output, or some combination of price in- 
creases and quality decreases. 
5The later 1986 PPCI survey follows the very sharp 
premium increases of the mid-1980s, but unfortunately 
does not contain data on prices. 
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proxy for the uninsured time costs of being 
sued. Potential claim severity would be a 
measure of exposure in excess of basic limits, 
but is imperfectly measured by observed 
severity because the latter tends to be in- 
versely correlated with claim frequency. 
Controlling for claim frequency and claim 
severity, the premium rate is a proxy for the 
loading charge for claim defense, adminis- 
tration, and profit, and any discrepancy be- 
tween prior claim frequency and severity 
and expected future claim costs. Since all 
three measures are potential proxies for dif- 
ferent dimensions of the malpractice climate, 
all three are included in the empirical analy- 
sis reported here. An alternative specifi- 
cation uses the individual physician's actu- 
al expenditure on malpractice insurance, 
treated as endogenous. The analysis controls 
for other relevant market area characteristics 
that are expected to affect physicians' fees 
and incomes. 
III. Empirical Results: 
A. Cross Section 
In all three years, the cross-section evi- 
dence shows a strong positive relationship 
between the various measures of the mal- 
practice climate and physicians' fees (Table 
1).6 The elasticity with respect to the physi- 
cian's (endogenous) expenditure on malprac- 
tice insurance is roughly .16 for office visit 
fees, and between .09 and .17 for hospital 
visit fees. The pattern across years does not 
support the hypothesis of delayed response 
of fees. This hypothesis would predict a 
larger positive relationship between fees and 
rates in 1978 (when physicians had several 
years to adjust prices to the sharp rate in- 
creases in 1974-76) than in 1976 or 1983 
which immediately followed sharp rate in- 
creases. Controlling for the rate for basic 
limits coverage, high claim severity is associ- 
ated with higher fees, whereas the coefficient 
on claim frequency is generally negative or 
TABLE 1-CROSS-SECTION RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN MALPRACTICE MEASURES 
AND FEES 
Variable 1976 1978 1983 
A. Dependent variable: Usual charge 
for office visit (Ln) 
RA TE (Ln) 0.105 0.103 0.113 
(10.22) (10.49) (6.74) 
CLAIM 
SEVERITY (Ln) 0.028 0.040 0.022 
(1.88) (3.47) (2.14) 
CLAIM 
FREQUENCY -0.006 0.003 -0.113 
(-1.70) (0.80) (-3.16) 
PREMIUMa (Ln) 0.155 0.165 0.176 
(8.82) (9.52) (6.52) 
B. Dependent variable: Usual charge 
for hospital follow-up visit (Ln) 
RATE (Ln) 0.039 0.047 0.110 
(2.98) (3.71) (4.46) 
CLAIM 
SEVERITY (Ln) 0.087 0.060 0.015 
(4.23) (3.91) (0.99) 
CLAIM 
FREQUENCY 0.014 0.01 0.016 
(2.91) (2.12) (0.31) 
PREMIUMa (Ln) 0.140 0.085 0.173 
(5.98) (3.96) (4.59) 
Note: Regression coefficients and t-statistics are shown 
in parentheses. 
aTwo-stage least squares. 
insignificant for office visit fees, and positive 
for hospital visit fees. 
The magnitude of the price elasticities 
suggests more than a full pass-through of the 
costs of insurance. There are several possible 
explanations for this. First, as discussed ear- 
lier, an increase in marginal cost can result 
in a more-than-proportional increase in price 
if market demand is inelastic and physicians 
act as profit-maximizing monopolistic com- 
petitors, or if third-party payers rapidly ad- 
just reimbursement rates, as they appear to 
have done. Second, if physicians are utility 
maximizers and derive significant negative 
utility from the threat of being sued, they 
would require positive compensating income 
differentials to remain in practice. A third 
possibility is an increase in "quality," such 
as time per visit. Preliminary analysis does 
show some evidence of increased time per 
visit. . 6Full equations are reported in our 1990 paper. 
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The elasticities of usual reimbursement 
paid by "the highest paying" Blue Shield 
and commercial insurer in the area and by 
Medicare are broadly similar to the elastici- 
ties for physicians' usual charges. However, 
the ability to pass-through malpractice costs 
to Medicaid reimbursement is more limited 
and appears to diminish over time, with a 
negative relationship by 1983. This is consis- 
tent with the general tightening of Medicaid 
limits on physician reimbursement in the 
1980s. 
When the sample is pooled across special- 
ties, the relationship between malpractice 
variables and net incomes is consistently 
positive, although weaker in 1983 than in the 
earlier years. This effect largely disappears 
when the data are disaggregated by spe- 
cialty, suggesting that pooling across special- 
ties induces a spurious positive correlation 
between net income and the specialty-specific 
malpractice rate, even with specialty dum- 
mies included in the estimating equation. 
These cross-sectional results are consistent 
with a model of the adjustment process in 
which there are significant positive and rapid 
adjustments in prices and reimbursement 
levels, and no significant negative effects on 
net income. 
B. Time-Series 
To distinguish between the models of ad- 
justment via changes in physician stocks, on 
the one hand, and rapid adjustment of prices 
on the other hand, we performed two types 
of tests. First, we reestimated the cross-sec- 
tion equations treating county-level physi- 
cian stocks as endogenous. The results were 
essentially unchanged. We also tested for the 
effect of changes in the malpractice variables 
on changes in physician stocks, and found 
no significant effects. Doctors did not leave 
(or choose to avoid) states whose malprac- 
tice climates worsened, relative to other 
states. 
Second, we examined the relationship be- 
tween changes in our measures of the mal- 
practice threat and the contemporaneous 
change in net incomes, prices, and hours 
over the seven-year period, 1976-1983. Since 
the individual physician data are not in the 
form of a panel, we cannot examine first 
differences at the level of the individual 
practice. Instead, we calculate sample aver- 
age values for observations grouped into the 
72 malpractice insurance rating territories, 
and take first differences in those averages. 
Because the sample number of physicians 
per territory varies, results are reported us- 
ing means weighted by the number of physi- 
cians in the territory. To control for changes 
in other area characteristics that might affect 
fee levels, we include the change in the pre- 
dicted value of Medicare prevailing charges 
for four physician services: GP office visits 
and hospital visits, hysterectomies, and cho- 
lecsystectomies. Because of the exploratory 
nature of this analysis, we discuss the results 
of stepwise analysis, with a selection signifi- 
cance level of 0.15. 
The first difference in malpractice pre- 
mium rates is positively associated with the 
change in average fees for office visits and 
for follow-up hospital visits, with signifi- 
cance at better than the 0.1 level. Other 
significant covariates of fee changes have the 
expected signs. None of the malpractice vari- 
ables was significant in explaining the change 
in net income or changes in insurers' reim- 
bursement rates. For the 1976-78 period, 
during which malpractice premiums gener- 
ally fell, the positive association between the 
malpractice variables and fees did not hold, 
suggesting that even if fees adjust rapidly 
upward, they are sticky downward. There 
was also no evidence of income decline asso- 
ciated with the malpractice variables. 
In conclusion, the evidence from the 
1976-83 period is consistent with the in- 
crease in malpractice costs being passed on 
fairly rapidly in higher fees, with little nega- 
tive effect on physician net incomes on aver- 
age or adjustment in physician stocks across 
market areas. We emphasize that these con- 
clusions are based on data that predate the 
sharp increase in malpractice premiums in 
the mid-1980s. The pass-through of these 
later cost increases may have been much less 
rapid because of the more competitive mar- 
ket for physician services and more aggres- 
sive cost-control practices of third-party 
payers. Second, finding no evidence of ef- 
fects on mean net incomes does not preclude 
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significant effects for individual physicians 
and adjustment of physician stocks or ser- 
vice flows within insurance rating territories. 
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